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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. In determining that an insurer has no statutory or 
common law requirement to give notice of an insurance policy's 
expiring by its own terms, did the panel of the Court of Appeals 
which affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment decide 
an important question of law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Utah Supreme Court? 
2. Did the panel of the Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, render a 
decision in conflict with another panel of the Court of Appeals on 
the same issue of law? 
3. Did the panel of the Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, render a 
decision in conflict with a decision of the Utah Supreme Court? 
4. Did the panel of the Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, so far 
depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings 
or so far sanction such a departure by the trial court as to call 
for the Supreme Court's exercise of its powers of supervision? 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) UTAH CODE ANNOT. This is a petition 
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for certiorari filed by Petitioner pursuant to Rules 45 to 51 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OR STATUTES, ETC, 
Respondent submits the only controlling statutory 
provisions important to the consideration of the Petition are the 
rules of appellate procedure for petitions for writs of 
certiorari Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The statutes and the case law set forth and described in the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari merely mimic and reiterate those 
set forth and fully briefed to the Court of Appeals by both 
parties. The Court of Appeals determined that the interpretation 
of those statutes and other legal issues were not necessary in 
rendering its opinion herein. To the extent this Court reviews 
the merits herein, the following constitutional and statutory 
provisions were cited by Petitioner to the Court of Appeals, but 
were deemed to be irrelevant and inapplicable: 
§ 31A-21-303 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) 
§ 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff/Appellant STUART, INC. ("STUART"), a Utah 
corporation which was involuntarily dissolved by the Utah State 
Department of Business Regulation on March 1, 1987 (R. 138) 
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commenced this action by filing a complaint against 
Defendant/Respondent JOHN DEERE INSURANCE CO. (-JOHN DEEREH) on 
August 1, 1988 (R. 1-13), 
The Complaint contained one cause of action. STUART 
complained of JOHN DEERE1s alleged failure to abide by the terms 
of an insurance policy which STUART alleged was contained within a 
Retail installment Contract ("Contract") (R. 2). The Retail 
installment Contract covered STUART'S purchase of a John Deere 
backhoe from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake City/ Utah (R.7). 
JOHN DEERE filed a motion for summary judgment on 
March 3, 1989 (R. 24-25). JOHN DEERE also filed a memorandum of 
points and authorities (R. 26-33) and# initially, two affidavits 
in support of its motion, those of Terry Digman (R. 34-44) and 
Howard Payne (R. 45-56). On or about March 14, 1989, and at the 
request of STUART, JOHN DEERE consented to extend the time within 
which STUART could respond to JOHN DEERE's motion (R. 57). On 
April 17, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed the Amended Affidavit of Howard 
Payne, which certified that the insurance policy attached to it 
was the policy in effect at the time STUART alleges it suffered 
its loss (R. 63-92). 
On May 16, 1989 (over 10 weeks after JOHN DEERE filed its 
motion), STUART filed its Statement of Points in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
-3-
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Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 93-109). On 
June 15, 1989, JOHN DEERE filed its Reply Brief in Support of its 
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to STUART'S cross 
motion for summary judgment (R. 117-127). Attached to this Reply 
Brief were the Affidavit of Deborah M. Kamenetzky (R. 128-137) and 
a certified copy of the March 1, 1987 Certificate of Dissolution 
by which STUART was no longer recognized as a legal entity in Utah 
(R. 138). STUART'S Reply Memorandum in support of its Cross 
Motion was filed on June 22, 1989 (R. 143-149). 
On August 10, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a Supplemental 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 165-175). That memorandum included a copy of 
a very recent memorandum opinion made, after trial to a jury, by 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on 
June 19, 1989 ("Arkansas Decision11). STUART replied to the 
Arkansas Decision on August 17, 1989 (R. 176-180). Finally, on 
August 22, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a motion for leave to set up 
counterclaim in the event its motion for summary judgment was 
denied (R. 181-183). 
After all supporting and opposing memoranda had been 
filed, the Second District Court heard oral argument on 
September 5, 1989. At the hearing on September 5, 1989, the lower 
court took the motions under advisement (R. 184). 
-4-
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On September 18, 1989, the lower court ruled on the 
pending motions for summary judgment. The lower court granted 
JOHN DEERE's motion for summary judgment and denied STUART'S cross 
motion for summary judgment (R. 195-197). The lower court later 
ruled that JOHN DEERE's motion for leave to set up counterclaim 
was moot (R. 202). 
At the lower court's direction, and pursuant to Rule 
4-504 UCJA, JOHN DEERE prepared and served its proposed Order of 
Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice 
(MOrderM) to counsel for STUART on September 21, 1989 (R. 207). 
STUART made no objections to the form of the proposed order, and 
the lower court signed and entered the Order on October 4, 1989 
(R. 206). 
STUART filed its Notice of Appeal on October 27, 1989 
(R. 208). On November 17, 1989 STUART moved this Court for 
summary disposition in its favor pursuant to Rule 10(A)(3) of the 
rules of this Court in effect at that time. After JOHN DEERE 
filed its Memorandum in Opposition to that motion, this Court 
denied STUART'S motion on December 22, 1989, pouring this case 
over to the Utah Court of Appeals on January 23, 1990. 
On December 19, 1990 the Utah Court of Appeals rendered 
its Decision affirming the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. (Opinion attached hereto as Appendix A). 
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St9t$ment Qf the Facts 
JOHN DEERE is an insurance company which provides 
insurance for John Deere & Company ("Deere & Company"), the 
manufacturers of heavy equipment (R. 128). One of the policies by 
which JOHN DEERE insures Deere & Company is a Retail installment 
Sales Floater Policy No. IM-14319 (hereafter "Master Policy") 
(R. 128). The Master Policy insures property owned by Deere & 
Company# and property sold under contract wherever that property 
is located (R. 68, 77). The effective date of the Master Policy 
is January 1, 1982 (R. 128). The Master Policy originally 
included an "Attachment of Insurance" provision, which provided, 
in part, as follows, 
This insurance terminates when the actual maturity date 
of the note is reached or the date on which the security 
interest of John Deere in said equipment terminates, 
whichever first occurs. 
(R. 128, 68). This shall hereafter be referred to as the 
"termination language." 
In 1983, it was the agreement and intention of the 
parties to the Master Policy, JOHN DEERE and Deere & Company, that 
the Master Policy would be changed to cover not only the actual 
financed merchandise, but to cover any additional security in 
favor of Deere & Company (R. 128). This additional security 
insurance amendment to the Master Policy was the only change 
contemplated and agreed to by the parties (R. 129). Initially, it 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was not put into writing. Between 1983 and 1989, JOHN DEERE 
honored all claims for loss of or damage to non-financed 
merchandise and equipment/ notwithstanding the fact that no 
formal, written amendment was made to that portion of the Master 
Policy (R. 129). 
In June, 1988, Deborah Kamenetzky, an in-house attorney 
for JOHN DEERE, undertook to revise the language in the Attachment 
of Insurance provision to reflect the intention of the parties 
regarding non-financial merchandise (R. 129). This change in the 
Master Policy was not formalized by writing until January, 1989 
(10 months after STUART suffered its loss and 5 years after it 
purchased the insurance) (R. 2, 129). By a clerical error, the 
termination language was omitted from the amended Attachment of 
Insurance provision (R. 129, 131, 81). 
Because John Deere*s security interest in the various 
machinery and equipment it sells under contract will vary per the 
terms of each and every individual contract, the Master Policy is 
not sent to them. Rather, individual certificates of insurance 
are sent to each of the additional insureds, such as STUART (R. 9). 
On December 20, 1983 STUART purchased a 1984 John Deere 
backhoe ("Backhoe") from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. This purchase was primarily on credit, since STUART 
paid $23,406.50 of the $82,266.50 sales price (R. 7). STUART 
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executed a Retail Purchase Installment Contract ("Contract-) by 
which it applied for credit from the John Deere Industrial 
Equipment Company to finance the remaining $62,194.29 of the 
purchase price (R. 7). The Contract provided for monthly payments 
to be made to John Deere by STUART, beginning on April 1# 1984 and 
ending on April 1, 1988 (R. 7). John Deere Industrial accepted 
the Contract on March 7, 1984 (R. 7). 
The Contract also required STUART to obtain physical 
damage insurance for the Backhoe (R. 8). The reason for this 
requirement was simple— until John Deere Industrial was paid 
off, it wanted to make sure that there was adequate insurance on 
the Backhoe to protect its security interest. The Contract 
contained the following language: 
If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I 
(we) will be furnished a certificate which describes the 
insurance. Such insurance shall terminate if the 
indebtedness is discharged, or if the holder's security 
interest in the equipment terminates, . . . or at the end 
of the term of the contract. . . . Any refunds or return 
premiums shall be applied toward existing indebtedness 
hereunder with the excess, if any, returned to me (us). 
(R. 8). 
STUART elected to purchase insurance from JOHN DEERE and 
paid a premium in the amount of $2,972.29 (R. 7). After John 
Deere Industrial accepted the Contract, it sent a Certificate of 
Physical Insurance ("Certificate of Insurance-) to STUART. After 
STUART received the Certificate of Insurance, and presumably read 
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its terms and description of insurance, STUART did not cancel the 
insurance and purchase insurance with different terms. STUART 
elected to keep the Backhoe insured under the terms described in 
the Certificate of Insurance. 
STUART'S certificate of insurance set forth the relevant 
dates of the Master Policy as it applied to STUART. The effective 
date of the insurance as to STUART was December 20, 1983, the date 
of purchase (R. 9). In addition to this information, the 
Certificate of Insurance repeated to STUART what the Contract had 
stated: 
This certifies that the equipment . . . is insured . . . 
until the expiration date shown above unless the 
insurance is terminated sooner as provided in the next 
sentence. The insurance shall terminate immediately 
without notice if any one of the following events occurs: 
the indebtedness is discharged; John Deere's security 
interest in the property which is the subject of the 
contract terminates; . . . or the Retail installment 
Sales Floater Policy under which John Deere has purchased 
the insurance is terminated. 
(R. 9). 
STUART never relied upon the Master Policy, nor did 
STUART even see a copy of the Master Policy until after this 
litigation commenced (R. 196, 206) (See, also. STUART'S Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Disposition, p. 6). In its Complaint, STUART alleged that the 
Contract was the insurance policy. "Defendant issued to Plaintiff 
a Physical Damage Insurance Policy, No. 870276283AA. . . ." 
(R. 2). The Contract is not the insurance agreement. 
-9-
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On or about January 20, 1988# STUART contacted John Deere 
Credit Services and requested a payoff amount (R.34). STUART was 
advised that the Backhoe could be paid off in full by February 10/ 
1988 for the sum of $5,578.72 (R. 34). On February 5, 1988, 
STUART paid $5#578.72 to John Deere Credit, which included a 
credit for the unearned insurance premium (R. 35). 
On March 9, 1988 the Backhoe was destroyed by fire of 
unknown origin (R. 2). STUART made a claim against what it 
thought was the insurance policy, which claim was denied by JOHN 
DEERE for the reason that upon STUART's early payoff, the 
indebtedness was discharged and Deere & Company no longer had a 
security interest in the Backhoe (R. 2). These events effected an 
expiration of the policy, and STUART brought its lawsuit. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should deny the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari because there is no reasonable legal or factual basis 
for the rule of law which was rejected by two courts below, and 
which Petitioner asks this Court to adopt. Petitioner's essential 
claim is that an insurer should be required to give an insured 
notice when a policy has expired by its terms. This is a position 
impliedly rejected by the Utah state legislature when it recently 
recodified its entire insurance code and failed to insert such a 
requirement. Also, this position was expressly rejected by the 
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Utah Court of Appeals in various published decisions, one of which 
is cited by Petitioner in its Petition. 
The purposes behind the rules governing writs of 
certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals are to serve 
the interest in continuity and consistency of law, unless there is 
some suggestion that either the trial court or Court of Appeals 
has strayed from the usual course of judicial proceedings in such 
a way that this Court should review the matter. The Court of 
Appeals already determined, when it decided to issue its opinion 
without publication, that the factual and legal issues involved 
were uncomplicated and not particularly noteworthy. This Court 
impliedly did so as well, when it determined to pour this case 
over to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, this Court should deny 
the Petition. 
As a separate matter, in light of the complete absence of 
a reasonable factual and legal basis for the Petition, and because 
the Court of Appeals was silent on the issue of costs to be 
awarded upon remittitur, Respondent respectfully asks this Court 
to award it its costs on appeal, its costs on the Petition, and a 
reasonable attorneys' fee in opposing the Petition as a sanction 
under Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
-11-
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/ 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER RAISED NO ISSUES IMPORTANT TO CERTIFICATION 
Respondent recognizes that the four grounds for granting 
a writ of certiorari set forth in Rule 46 are not complete/ in 
that they do not set forth all of the grounds or reasons upon 
which this Court may desire to review a decision of the Court of 
Appeals. However, Rule 46 does indicate that a petition for writ 
of certiorari should be granted only for reasons of a "character" 
similar to those expressly set forth in Rule 46. Respondent 
herein respectfully submits that the "character" of reasons for 
certiorari fall into two underlying policies. 
The first and predominant policy underlying Rules 45-51 
(embodied in subparts (a), (b), and (d) of Rule 46) is to make the 
law in Utah clear and unambiguous. This policy suggests that this 
Court should address any inconsistencies between any respective 
decisions within separate panels of the Court of Appeals, or 
between the Court of Appeals and this Court. Further, if the 
Court of Appeals has addressed an important issue of law, this 
Court may want to settle the matter. The second policy (embodied 
in subpart (c) of Rule 46) is to ensure that neither the trial 
court nor the Court of Appeals has departed from procedure such 
that a party's rights have been materially prejudiced. 
A reading of the Petition reveals that Petitioner is 
essentially making the same arguments it has made to both the 
-12-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court and to the Court of Appeals, which arguments amount to 
a disagreement over the interpretation of an insurance contract. 
Two courts, one trial court and one appellate court, have already 
heard Petitioner's claims and rejected them. In the case of the 
Court of Appeals, the factual and legal issues were deemed to be 
of so uncomplicated and unimportant a nature that it elected not 
to publish a written opinion. Presumably, this Court similarly 
determined that the issues presented were not novel, unique or 
sufficiently important when it poured the case over to the Court 
of Appeals in January, 1990. Because Petitioner has made no 
showing of a reason to review the Court of Appeals' decision, this 
Court should deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
A. Three Of The Four Grounds For Granting Certiorari 
Are Not Even Pled by Petitioner. 
Petitioner made no showing, and did not even contend that 
the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment conflicted with any other decisions of another 
panel of the Court of Appeals, or of this Court. Further, 
Petitioner did not and can not claim that the trial court or Court 
of Appeals so far departed from any procedures that a review by 
this Court is merited. Therefore, the only grounds upon which 
Petitioner does claim entitlement to a review by this Court is a 
so called "important social policty]" (Petition For Writ Of 
Certiorari at p. 18) supposedly safeguarded by the Utah state 
-13-
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legislature. Respondent submits that the clear and unambiguous 
language of both the insurance contract at issue, as well as the 
statutes cited by Petitionee do not require an insurance company 
to notify an insured when an insurance policy expires of its own 
terms/ which is precisely what happened in this case. 
B. The Court Of Appeals' Ruling Was Consistent With 
Clear And Unambiguous Law, And Review By This Court 
Is Unnecessary. 
Petitioner misunderstands the purpose of its Petition for 
Certiorari, and the requirements of Rules 45-51 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In its Petition, Petitioner has mimicked the 
same arguments it made to the trial court and to the Court of 
Appeals. In its Conclusion, Petitioner asks this Court to reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and to grant its motion for 
cross summary judgment. Seeking affirmative relief is not the 
purpose of a petition. The purpose of the Petition is to try to 
demonstrate to this Court important reasons for review, and not to 
reargue the case. Should this Court determine that sufficient 
reasons for review exist, then, pursuant to Rule 51(b) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, briefing and oral argument on the 
merits would be appropriate. As impliedly conceded by Petitioner, 
no justification for review by this Court exists outside of the 
same legal arguments made to two courts below. 
In considering the Petition, this Court should note first 
that there was no factual dispute below. Petitioner conceded this 
-14-
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when it made its cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 93-109). 
Therefore, there are only legal issues involved. 
The second point which this Court should consider, or 
rather reject, is that there was some kind of "secret*1 or "silent" 
termination of the insurance policy herein by John Deere. Neither 
the trial court, nor the Court of Appeals found that the insurance 
policy was terminated. Rather, each found that the insurance 
contract expired by its own terms. When every document in the 
hands of the Petitioner unambiguously informed it that paying off 
the backhoe would end the insurance contract, Petitioner's claims 
of not knowing about the insurance's expiring are unfounded. 
Lastly, Petitioner asks this Court to find an obligation 
to insure when no premium for the time period during which the 
loss occurred was paid. Petitioner claims on page 11 of its 
Petition that "Plaintiff did not receive a full refund of 
insurance premiums until after the date of loss." This is false, 
and there is no factual dispute on the matter. The record is 
clear that on February 5, 1988, Petitioner paid off its backhoe, 
which payment included an offsetting credit for unearned premium. 
(R. at 35). This occurred 5 weeks before the backhoe was 
destroyed by fire on March 9, 1988 (R. at 2), during which time 
Petitioner could have obtained insurance from another source. 
Therefore, Petitioner's claims of having been dealt with unfairly, 
secretly, or silently are unsupported and insupportable. 
-15-
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1. Ut9h C9SS t*9w SUPPOrti? the CPVFt Pf Appeals' Decision. 
Petitioner impliedly concedes the legal and statutory 
propriety of an insurance policy's expiring by its own terms, 
without the legal necessity of notice by the insured. Petitioner 
concedes the exception to notice requirements where "the 
termination is for nonpayment of premiums at the normally 
scheduled expiration date occurring at the "end of the one-year 
policy term." Petition at pp. 10-11. Petitioner also stated that 
the policy reason for allowing the policy to expire without 
further notice is because "the insured obviously knows of his own 
present delinquency in making premium payments." I£. at 11. This 
same policy, applied to John Deere's contract, compels the same 
conclusion reached by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioner certainly knew that it had paid off the back-
hoe, and certainly knew that John Deere1s security interest in the 
backhoe dissolved upon final payment. Those two conditions to 
policy expiration were made known to Petitioner from the beginning 
of the contract, and it cannot now claim ignorance. It would be 
equally unavailing to the Petitioner to say he was unaware of the 
requirement to pay a policy premium, and therefore failure to pay 
it should not work an expiration of the policy until he was 
formally notified. Such a legal position was acknowledged by 
Petitioner to be meritless, yet it is no different from the 
-16-
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position it asserts now. The Court of Appeals has made this clear 
in at least two rulings, Godoy v. Farmers Ins. Group, 759 P.2d 
1173/ 1175-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Clarke v. American Concept 
Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). For these 
reasons, a writ of certiorari is unwarranted in this case. 
C. The Statutes Cited By Petitioner Do Not Require 
Notice When An Insurance Policy Expires By Its Own 
Terms. 
Petitioner cites to Sections 31A-21-201, 
31A-21-303(1)(C), 31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv), 31A-21-303(3), 31A-21-304 
and 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. as controlling statutes to be 
considered by this Court. Petition at ii-iii. Of these, 
Petitioner only referenced sections 31A-21-303(1)(c), 
31A-21-303(3) and 70C-6-304 as controlling in the appeal below, 
which it did pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Brief of Appellant at iv; Reply Brief of 
Appellant at iv. Any issues and/or arguments raising statutes not 
considered by the Court of Appeals below are contrary to the 
policy of this Court, expressed numerous times, that failure to 
raise an issue with a lower court precludes a later review. See, 
e.g. Beroer v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. of St. Paul. 723 
P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1986). Therefore, this Court may disregard 
the applicability, or not, of Sections 31A-21-201, 
31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv) and 31A-21-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. to the issues 
raised herein. 
-17-
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Even if this Court considers all of the statutes cited by 
Petitioner, one thing is clear. Each of the statutes contemplate 
situations in which the insurer, either on its own or at the 
request of a third party such as a creditor, affirmatively 
terminates the insurance policy in question. These statutes 
contemplate some kind of unilateral act of the insurer, in which 
case notice of that act of cancellation or termination is 
required. This Court should disregard those statutes for the same 
reason that the Court of Appeals found them irrelevant and 
unavailing. 
The facts of this case do not lead us to the conclusion 
that John Deere cancelled the policy. "Cancellation" in 1 
the insurance context is the right to rescind, abandon, 
or cancel a contract of insurance. [Citation omitted]. 
John Deere took no action to cancel the policy. Such 
action was not necessary. The policy expired based upon 
its own terms. 
< 
December 19, 1990 Opinion at p. 3. 
Because none of the statutes or policies raised by 
Petitioner are applicable to an insurance contract which expired 
< 
of its own clear and unambiguous terms, this Court should deny the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS TO 
RESPONDENT. ( 
Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires costs to be awarded to the appellee in cases where an 
appeal is dismissed and the parties have not otherwise agreed, or < 
-18-
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the court has not otherwise ordered that costs would not be 
awarded. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is silent on the 
issue of costs. Under Rule 34(d)# and since the case was remitted 
back to the district court on January 9, 1991, Respondent had 
until January 24, 1991 to file its verified bill of costs with the 
district court. However, Petitioner filed its Petition on or 
about January 17, 1991, thereby removing jurisdiction from the 
district court, and tolling the time period for a billing of costs 
to be filed. If this Court determines to deny the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Respondents respectfully request that this 
Court order the taxing of costs on appeal against Petitioner, 
including costs incurred in connection with the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. 
Further, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Respondent respectfully submits that 
Petitioner's Petition was frivolous, and requests an award of its 
attorneys' fees incurred in connection herewith. Petitioner's 
arguments to impose a common law duty upon insurers requiring 
notification of an insurance policy's expiration on its own terms 
are not good faith arguments to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. Petitioner's arguments lack any reasonable basis in 
fact or law, and are therefore frivolous. 
Egregious cases may include those obviously without 
merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and 
which result in the delay of a proper judgment. 
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Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See 
also Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 71, 73 (Utah 
Ct. Ap. 1990); O'Brien v. Rush 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Petitioner has essentially asked this Court to legislate 
by requiring notice of insurance expiration when the legislature 
and the Court of Appeals have impliedly and expressly rejected 
such a burden. See, Clarke, supra, 758 P.2d at 473. Seeking 
judicial legislation is not a good faith attempt to modify or 
extend existing law. For these reasons, and because Respondent 
has had to incur the attorneys fees and costs associated with 
responding to all of Petitioner's meritless claims throughout this 
litigation, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to award it 
its attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
to grant it all of its costs on appeal, and to award attorneys' 
fees incurred in connection with the Petition. 
Respectfully submitted/ 
dW • 
Mark 0. Morris 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Stuart, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John Deere Insurance Company, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
**tyry T Noonan 
Clem osra Court 
Utah Court « Appeals 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No- 900052-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 19, 1990) 
Second District, Davis County 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Attorneys: Douglas M. Durbano, Paul H. Johnson and David 
Miller, Ogden, for Appellant 
Mark 0. Morris, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Stuart, Inc. (Stuart) appeals from a summary judgment 
dismissing its claim of breach of contract. Stuart asserts 
three claims of error: (1) there was a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether the insurance contract was an 
integrated document; (2) the trial court improperly derived the 
intent of the parties from extrinsic and parol evidence; and 
(3) the trial court erred in finding that the insurance 
contract terminated prior to April 1, 1988, without notice of 
cancellation. Stuart claims that any one of the above errors 
would preclude the trial court from granting summary judgment 
to John Deere Insurance Company (John Deere). Thus, Stuart 
asserts that we should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on John Deere*s motion and grant the 
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a backhoe from John 
Deere Industrial Equipment Company on a retail installment 
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contract. John Deere issued an insurance policy covering the 
backhoe. On February 5, 1988, Stuart made the final payment on 
the installment contract- On March 9, 1988, the backhoe was 
destroyed by fire. Stuart made a claim under the insurance 
contract, which was denied by John Deere.1 
On August 1, 1988, Stuart filed a complaint alleging 
breach of contract by John Deere. After oral arguments, based 
on the stipulated material facts, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of John Deere. Stuart appealed. 
ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW 
Stuart first argues that there was an issue of material 
fact pending before the trial court. Stuart asserts that 
whether the contract was ambiguous or integrated concerning the 
parties* intent is a factual question. Here, Stuart is 
confusing two separate doctrines of contract law. These 
doctrines concern (1) whether a written contract is fully 
integrated so as to trigger the parol evidence rule; and (2) 
whether a provision of a written contract is ambiguous so that 
extrinsic evidence must be considered to construe it. 
First, whether a contract is an integration is a question 
of fact. Rinowood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.. 671 P.2d 182, 
183 (Utah 1983). If the contract is not integrated, parol 
evidence is admissible to determine the parties' intent even if 
it means varying a term of the written part of the parties' 
overall agreement. Here, Stuart did not raise any facts 
suggesting the parties had any agreement or understandings 
other than as set out in the written contract documents. 
The second legal doctrine concerns whether any material 
term of the contract is ambiguous. -Interpretation of a 
written contract is ordinarily a question of law, and this 
court need not defer to the trial court's construction." Jones 
v. HinKle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Provo cifcv Corp. v. 
Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). "Contract 
provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that 
the parties urge diverse interpretations." Jones. 611 P.2d at 
735. While extrinsic evidence is admissible to assist in the 
interpretation of ambiguous terms, the threshold question of 
whether a provision is ambiguous is a question of law. See, 
e.c . Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
1. Both of the parties stipulate that these are the undisputed 
material facts of the case. 
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We find the provisions of the basic policy and amendment to be 
entirely unambiguous, as did the trial court. Thus, we 
construe the critical contractual provisions, as a matter of law. 
The primary policy of the insured contained the following 
termination provision: "This insurance terminates when the 
actual maturity date of the note is reached or the date on 
which the security interest of John Deere in said equipment 
terminates, whichever first occurs." An amendment to the 
policy was made on September 1, 1983, without mention of the 
above termination provision. The amendment to the original 
policy contained the following saving language: "Nothing 
herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter, or extend 
any of the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the 
policy, other than as herein stated." The trial court 
concluded as a matter of law that, after the above amendment, 
-the basic policy . . . remained the same, including that 
aforementioned statement concerning termination of the policy 
when the security interest of John Deere was satisfied." We 
agree with the trial court's legal determination. When Stuart 
paid the debt, John Deere no longer had an insurable security 
interest in the backhoe. Thus, the insurance policy coverage 
ended when Stuart paid off the balance owing on the retail 
installment contract. We conclude as matter of law that the 
insurance contract was unambiguous and the insurance coverage 
terminated when Stuart paid the balance owing on the note. 
Although the trial court had before it certain extrinsic 
evidence, it was not relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion 
because the contract was unambiguous. Thus, we need not 
consider Stuarfs second issue further. 
EXPIRATION OR CANCELLATION 
Stuart also claims that John Deere cancelled the policy 
without prior notice to the insured as required by the policy. 
The facts of this case do not lead us to the conclusion that 
John Deere cancelled the policy. "Cancellation- in the 
insurance context is the right to rescind, abandon, or cancel a 
contract of insurance. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 380 (1982). 
John Deere took no action to cancel the policy. Such action 
was not necessary. The policy expired based upon its own 
terms. "The usual effect of a termination of a policy is the 
termination of coverage thereunder, and where a policy expires 
by its own terms • • . at a specified time, generally no basis 
exists thereafter upon which to predicate a recovery." 43 Am. 
Jur. 2d Insurance § 237 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Here, the 
policy was not cancelled as Stuart claims, but instead expired 
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pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties. The policy 
contained a provision that it would terminate when John Deere 
Industrial Equipment Company's security interest in the backhoe 
terminated. When Stuart paid off the backhoe, John Deere 
Industrial Equipment Company had no further insurable interest 
in the backhoe. Thus, the policy expired simultaneously with 
the expiration of John Deere Industrial Equipment Company's 
interest in the backhoe and notice was not required. We affirm. 
Norman H. Jackson,*\Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
a ^?l£> ^L 
*judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory if. Orme, Judge 
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